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,.\naIYsingThe Trends of Split-Ticket Voting in Israel
QIORA GOLDB ERG

Bar-flan University, Israel
Introduction
When and why do voters split their tickets? Who is the typical ticketplitter? Are there institutional conditions which affect the phenomenon of
:plit-ticket voting? How is split-ticket voting related to coattail influence?
The answers to these four basic questions can provide us with a better
understanding and forecasting of election results.
The analysis of split-ticket voting patterns is limited to elections in
which voters are given at least two sets of electoral choices. Systematic
analysis over time is possible where election laws determine that elections to
different institutions and/or at various levels take place at the same time.
Thus, it is no wonder that American political scientists are interested in this
phenomenon much more than their colleagues in other countries. In Israel,
for example, there is no legal necessity to hold elections at the national and
the local levels at the same time, although this was the conventional arrangement until 1973, providing wide possibilities for the study of voting
behavior.
The voting behavior of the Israeli electorate is interesting in itself,
while its theoretical importance goes far beyond local-domestic significance. Israel has been described several times as an etat partitaire,' a
characteristic which is crucial to the phenomenon of split-ticket voting as
well as coattail influence. However, especially since the Yorn Kippur War of
1973, the Israeli political system has undergone a basic change. 2 One of the
fundamental changes was the weakening of the etat partitaire, namely, a
vast decline in the power of the parties as compared to other political institutions, especially interest groups. This trend should have led, among
others, to an increase in the rate of split-ticket voting. The primary aim of
this article is to prove that the expected increase did not occur and to explain
the reasons for this.
Elazar's arguement that split-ticket voting has been increasing in Israel
since the 1960's will be challenged through an analysis of three elections:
1973, 1977 and 1978. 3 Elazar perceives this trend in the contest of a "transition from ideologically based politics to politics based on territorial subdivisions,"• considering it as a "sign of the growing maturity of the electorate"'
and "an indicator of greater political integration. " 6 The tendency to
analyse split-ticket voting in the broader context of a basic social or political
change is not unique to Elazar. De Vires and Tarrance did the same with
regard to the American electorate, adding an optimistic assessment that the
ticket-splitters "offer the best hope for the revitalization of our unique
American democrary, " 1 a conclusion which is not far from Elazar's normative consideration of the split-ticket voting phenomenon in Israel.
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However, Elazar's conclusions are not based on systematic measurement,
Hence, the first task at this stage is to formulate an appropriat e method to
measure the phenomenon of split-ticket voting.
Method
Burnahm defined split-ticket voting "as the difference between the
highest and lowest percentages of the two-party vote cast for either Party
among the arrary of statewide offices in any given election," and, by the
same token, concluded that "zero on this scale would correspond to absolute uniformity in partisan division of the vote for all offices at the same
election." ' Such a conclusion may be credible in terms of survey data, but
not when using aggregate data.
Dealing with aggregate data necessitates taking into account two
elements: a) the risks of an "ecological fallacy;" b) the possibility that the
rate of ticket-splitting is actually much higher than that which has been
measured because voters who split their tickets in opposite directions cancel
each other out, thus being computed as straight-ticket voters . Arian and
Weiss, analysing split-ticket voting in Israel, tried to solve this problem by
stating that "in the case of a party which received 35 percent of the vote to
the Knesset and 30 percent of the vote to the municipality, approxi mately 30
percent of the voters voted twice for the same party."'
Arian and Weiss developed an index of split-ticket voting aimed at
comparing rates of split-ticket voting in different communities in a single
election, or in more than one election in the same community. x is the
percentage of votes received by a given party on one level; y is the percentage of votes received by that party at another level; n is the total number of
parties competing. In order to avoid negative differences between x and y,
they squared the difference . Thus, their index was as follows:

n

~ (x· -y·)

~1

1

1

2

n

Pomper criticized this index, stating that is "fluctuates within no
standardized range" as a result of the failure "to take the square-root of a
sum of squared differences." 10 While Pomper's criticism is in principle
useful and explains to what extent the original index was statistic ally biased,
he himself ignores the mathematical rule that taking a square root must give
two results, positive and negative. Thus, nothing has been solved. Had
Arian and Weiss, as well as Pomper, used the absolute value of the difference, they would have solved the problem of negative numbers . But their
main failure lay in placing the number of parties in the denominator . This
has nothing to do with split-ticket voting. The proper denomin ator should
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was considered twice in the numerator
2' since each voter's preference
behen
· he supporte d . C onsequent Iy, t h e revise
. d m.
analysing the two parties
:ex of split-ticket voting should be:

2

The index ranges from zero (no split-ticket voting at all) to 100 (maxunal split-ticket voting). The values obtained by using this index are the
assumed percentages of voters who split their tickets.
Arian and Weiss examined split-ticket voting at the national and
municipal levels in four elections: 1955, 1959, 1965 and 1969. 11 The 1973
elections were the last in which the national and municipal levels could be
compared and are the first of three cases examined here. The next national
election was held in May I 977, while the municipal elections were held in
November 1978. The latter is the second case analysed below, but here the
analysis framework is different because in the interim an institutional
change occurred. For the first time, mayors were elected on a personal
basis, while the local councils continued to be elected through party lists.
Previously, the councils themselves had elected the mayors following coalition bargaining.
The third case examined are the elections of June 1977 for the
Histadrut (labor federation). These elections had also been previously conducted on a single ballot, with the local organs of the statewide organization-the workers' councils-being
constituted according to the results in
each community. In June 1977, for the first time, the workers' councils
were elected on a separate ballot. Thus, voters could split their tickets between the national and the local levels. The secretaries of these councils continued to be elected by the councils themselves.
The Histadrut is a national federation of trade unions, founded in
1920. It is the broadest voluntary organization in Israel and is highly
politicized. In the 1977 election to the Knesset, there were 2,236,293 eligible
voters, as compared to 1,565,000 in the Histadrut elections a month later.
The Histadrut elections have important political implications, since this
organization controls basic social services, such as health insurance and
pension funds. The Histadrut employs more people than any other
organization in Israel. The elections to the professional trade unions which
comprise the Histadrut are held separately at different times, and with no
formal connection to the elections to the national institutions and workers'
councils of the Histadrut.
In order to set a useful comparative framework for the three cases
analysed, it was decided to consider the party system as being c·omposed of
four components: Alignment (a socialist bloc which held office at the na85

tional level until 1977); Likud (a right-wing bloc which was in op po sition a
the national level until 1977); the religious camp which includes thre e Partie~
in the Knessett; ' 2 and other which are often the smaller parties at the na.
tional level and the local lists (often not related to any existing national
party) at the local level. This four-fold framework makes po ssible a
systematic treatment of all split-ticket voting settings.
All election results were computed according to the rev ised index
presented above. In the analysis of the Histadrut elections the vot es in the
kibbutzim and moshavim were omitted because these agricu ltural settlements are not connected to any workers' council and the refore their
members did not take part in the election at the local leve l. Of the 6S
workers' councils, 66 were analyses; two are Arab-dominated an d therefore
require special treatment. In the elections to the local authorities , 92 com.
munities were analysed-34 of them cities and the rest smaller communities
which do not have the formal status of a city. The Arab comm un ities were
again omitted, as were two small Jewish communities-in
one, the religious
camp and the Likud formed a pre-election coalition and ran on a joint list
and with a single candidate for the office of mayor, while in the second only
local lists took part, and not the three traditional political blocs. In the 1973
elections, 92 communities were ana lyses at both levels. T hese election
reflected the electoral system for the Knes et, in which the re are party list
and the whole country is considered a single constituency. This is a radical
PR version which leaves almost no room for regional interests. When the
expression of regional preferences is blocked at the nationa l level, it is
hypothesized that these will emerge forcefully in the municipa l elections.

Findings
The results for the three elections-I
in Table I.

973, I 977 and I 978-are

pre sented

Table I: Election results by political blocs (in percentages )
Knesset
Alignment
Likud
Religious
Others
n

1973
Municipal

National

1977
Local

40.0
34.1
12.3
13.6

39.1
28.5
15.4
17.0

52.7
32. 1
2.0
13.2

52.9
31.3
2.4
13.4

1317731

1309729

762490

754274

1978
Counci l Mayor
30.5
26.4
18.3
24.8

33.2
31.2
12.1
23.5

1110000 1085199

Alignment voters are consistently more stable than othe rs, with an
average difference in the three cases of 1.27%, as compared to 3.73 OJofor
the Likud, 3.23% for the religious camp, and 1.63% for the oth ers. The
relatively high difference of the religious camp in 1978 is a res ult of the election laws stating that a candidate for mayor must win at least 400Jo of the
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te in order to be elected. The religious parties are well aware of the fact
viat this requirement is usually beyond their strength and prefer, therefore,
t form pre-election coalitions with one of the two great blocs. Hence, some
~~ the Alignment's candidates and especially those of the Likud gain many
eligious votes on the personal ballot.
r
Using aggregate data does not enable us to draw decisive conclusions as
the
specific directions of the split votes, but we can assume that the
0
:trongest links exist between the Likud and the religious parties, and between the Likud and the smaller parties and local lists. In each of the three
cases these links are reflected in better achievement at different levels. For
example, the Likud was stronger at the national level in 1973 and 1977,
while the religious and other parties were both stronger at the local level. In
l978 the Likud was stronger on the personal ballot, while the religious and
other parties were stronger on the council ballot. When there are two levels,
such as national and local, some of the religious voters prefer to give their
votes on the national ballot to the Likud, while some Likud voters are loyal
to this bloc only on the national ballot and vote for local lists on the other.
The evidence needed to test these two hypotheses must be drawn from
urvey data.
Table 2 describes the nationwide rates of split-ticket voting by three
alternate methods of measurement. First split-ticket voting is calculated
without taking into account specific results in communities but by analysing
the total achievement of the four blocs. Second, average split-ticket voting
for a community is calculated on the basis of the results in each community.
Finally, the number of voters in each community is taken into account in
order to form a weighted average of split-ticket voting.
Table 2: Split-Ticket Voting by Three Methods of Measurement

General
Community average
Community weighted
average

1973

1977

1978

6.5
20.1
15.8

0.8
6.3
2.3

7.5
13.9
11.7

The transition from the first method of measurement to the other two
decreases the risks of "ecological fallacy," namely, using large units of
analysis partially cancels real split-ticket voting. The data presented in
Table 2 reveals that the first alternative provides biased results, expressed in
low rates of split-ticket voting. The difference between the community
averages and the weighted averages may indicate a trend of low split-ticket
voting in large communities, resulting in a decreased rate of split-ticket
voting when using the community weighted averages. But a word of caution
is required at this point: low rates in large communities may again be a
result of the "ecological fallacy."
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The differences in the rate of split-ticket-,roting in the three cases ref
. . k et votmg
. h as consistent
.
1y increase
.
d over time.
. Ute
t h e argument t h at sp 11t-t1c
1
1973 this rate was high, then dropped in 1977 and rose aga in in 1 n
978
though it did not reach as high a level as in 1973. We therefore have to lo k
for more profound causes to explain the differences among them . Alrea~
at this stage we can conclude that the clue lies in the differing nature of th!
three cases.
Of the total number of communities, 35 can be analysed co mparative!
in all three elections, while in others the voting districts differe d from
tion to election. Table 3 describes rates of split-ticket voti ng in these 35
communities in all three elections.

ele!_

Table 3: Split-Ticket Voting by Communities

Eben-Yehuda
Or-Akiva
Azor
Eilat
Ashdod
Ashkelon
Beer -Yaakov
Beit-Shean
Beit -Shemesh
Bnei-Brak
Bat-Yam
Gedera
Gan-Yavne
Dimona
Hadera
Holon
Yavne
Yehud
Yerucham
Kfar-Saba
Karmiel
Migdal-Haemek
Maalot
Nazeret-Illit
Netanyah
Acre
Kadima
Kiryat-Gat
Kiryat -Malachi
Rosh-Haayin
Ramla
Ramat-Hasharon
Shderot
Tel-Aviv

1973

1977

1978

41.3
5.3
21.6
11.8
22.3
8.3
32.2
8.0
20.6
15.9
4.8
36.6
11.2
28.9
12.8
10.0
13.9
15.7
24.7
16.8
12.4
14.9
8.0
6.7
13.9
17.0
9.3
7.4
8.0
33.4
24.3
48.3
14.8
6.8

16.3
11.0
8.6
3.5
7.55
4.2
10.3
4.35
17.55
6.0
6.0
3.9
18.7
5.35
6.6
0.7
5.75
7.4
8.3
1.3
3.65
5.15
27.0
6.6
1.85
12.8
7.45
2.65
6.35
16.1
2.15
0.7
1.45
0.45

5.7
8.25
15. 1
9.5
42.7
7.3
34.6
4.4
19.4
5.4
5.4
12
3.55
10.9
6.0
10.7
31.0
8.6
1.8
7.2
11.0
25.0
18.5
8.0
8.6
19.3
11.9
18.3
17.0
5. 1
3.8
17 .1
3.3
11.5
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Of the 35 communities, 16 reflect the general pattern whereby the 1973
tions are characterized by high rates of split-ticket voting, the 1977 elece_Ie\ by Jaw rates, and the 1978 elections by rates which are higher than
uon e of 1977 but lower than those of 1973. In I 9 communities there are
th
:~ation s from the general pattern. These deviations were caused by five
de es of high rates in 1977, seven cases of low rates in 1978, five cases of
c~sh rate s in J978, and eight cases of low rates in 1973. These last eight cases
hig be explained by the absence or marginality of local lists. In such cases,
~~ud supporters tend to vote a straight ticket and the overall rate of split'cket voting declines. Nazeret-Illit is a typical example, with no local lists
nnd a very straig ht voting pattern by Likud supporters of 24% at the na~ional level and 25.1 OJoat the municipal level. The five cases of high splitticket voting in 1977 resulted from an opposite trend: strong local lists were
upported by those who voted for the Likud at the national level. GanYavne is a good example of this: Likud received 34.5% on the national
ballot and only 16.6% at the municipal level as a result of the 18.6% success
of a local list.
The 1978 deviations can be divided into two categories: those communities in which split-ticket voting rates were very low, and those in which
they were very high. The latter type appears where the religious parties did
not take part in the personal ballot but did take part in the council ballot.
As a result, most religious voters shifted their support to the Likud. In
Migdal-Haemek, for example, the religious parties gained 20.2% at the
council level, but did not take part in the personal ballot. Therefore, the
Likud's mayoral candidate won 53. 70Jo of the votes although his party
achieved only 38.6% on the council ballot. In general, the religious parties
did not take part in the personal ballot in communities where they had no
realistic chance of achieving the 400Jo minimum required for election.
Low rates of split-ticket voting in 1978 appeared in communities in
which religious candidates ran for the office of mayor. In these communities the religious parties achieved relatively high results and their supporters did not shift their votes to Likud candidates . In Gan-Yavne, for example, where there were no local lists, the religious parties gained 33.4% on
the council ballot and 35.4% on the personal ballot; the Likud, 28.7% and
25.2%; and the Alignment, 37.3% and 39.4%, respectively. No candidate
achieved 400Jo in the first round. In the second round, the Alignment can didate was defeated, achieving only 44.1 OJowhile most Likud supporters
backed the religious candidate who won by 55.9%. The deviations described
above strengthen the argument that much of split-ticket voting is a result of
transfers between the Likud and the religious parties, and to a lesser extent
between the Likud and the local lists. Alignment voters are revealed as the
most stable of the four groups.
Analysis

The main trends still need to be explained. Why was split-ticket voting
relatively high in 1973, low in 1977, and medium in 1978? Were there
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systematic factors which affected the various rates and which hav
theoretical significance beyond the Israeli context? The explana tions Whi ~
will be presented here aim at building a framework which can also be ac
plied in other political systems.
p.
Five factors strengthen split-ticket voting:
a) Elections which permit the expression of personal pref erences ar
characterized by high rates of split-ticket voting, in contrast to elections i e
which voters are confronted only with party lists. Even when candidat~
represent parties, their very existence as individuals weakens part y solidarit
and contributes to high rates of split-ticket voting. Very high rates of spJi{.
ticket voting will appear if personal candidates and not party lists exist at
both levels. If there are candidates at one level and party lists at the other (as
in 1978), split-ticket voting will be somewhat lower, but still higher than in a
situation in which party lists exist at both levels (as in 1973 and 1977).
b) Split-ticket voting is an acquired behavior pattern. Hence, the more institutionalized a procedural setting which enables ticket-splitti ng, creating a
tradition of split-ticket voting, the more voters tend to split their tickets.
Faced with new electoral procedures in 1977 and 1978, some vot ers were not
fully aware of the split-ticket possibility. In contrast, in the 1973 elections
the voters encountered the same electoral procedure for the fifth time,
namely, elections to be the local authorities and to the nationa l legislature
on the same day.
c) In elections held at different levels, i.e. national and local, there is much
more room for split-ticket voting than in elections held at a single level. The
existence of different levels legitimizes the possibility of split-ticket voting
since voters can easily differentiate between them. This diffe rentiation is
strengthened in countries where the electoral system at the nat ional levelis
such that the entire country is treated as a single constituency, while an electoral system in which candidates are elected by district does no t block the
regional factor and reduces tensions between center and peri phery.
The 1973 and 1977 elections involved different levels, while in 1978
only the local level was involved. If two levels exist, split-ticket voting is
higher when both have the same degree of political salience. This was the
case in the 1973 elections; in 1977, however, the political salie nce of the national level was high while that of the local level was low .
The electoral system of the 1977 Histadrut elections did no t take into
account the fundamental units of the Histadrut periphery-t ho se which
function at the grass-roots of trade union politics-namely
the workers'
committees, which are organized by place of employment. In contra st, the
workers' councils are considered less important bodies which were traditionally dominated by the central leaderships of the parties. Wo rker s' councils are composed along geographical lines, while the main problems of
workers have nothing to do with regions but with occupationa l and professional issues which cut across regional lines.
d) In elections to different institutions there is even more roo m for split-
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. ket voting than in elections to the same institution-for
example national
islature, state legislature, local authority, presidency, trade union, etc.
~tctions to different institutions do not necessarily coincide with elections
different levels. It is possible to hold elections at different levels and to
~~fferent institutions, but also to hold elections at different levels to the
1
me institution, or at the same level to different institutions. When voters
~e confronted with elections to various institutions, they can easily split
aheirtickets, while elections to the same institution encourage straight-ticket
~oting. In I 973, elections were held to different institutions, while the 1977
and I 978 elections were held to the same institutions (Histadrut in 1977 and
Jocal authorities in 1978).
Higher rates of split-ticket voting in elections to different institutions
can also be explained by a technical element of the electoral procedure.
Rusk found that the institutional environment plays a crucial role in splitticket voting behavior. ' 1 In his study he presents evidence showing that the
introduction and establishment of the Australian Ballot in America at the
end of the nineteenth century led to an increase in split-ticket voting in comparison to the previous ballot systems. In this new system, both parties were
placed on the same ballot, guaranteeing a secret vote. By the same token, we
can argue that the existence of two separate polling stations in the Israeli
1973elections, one for each institution, supplied the voter with a more appropriate institutional environment for ticket-splitting than in 1977 and
1978when both ballots were cast at the same polling booth. Moreover, in
1973there was a time gap between the two elections which did not exist in
1977and 1978. This technical difference may also help explain the high rate
of split-ticket voting in 1973 as compared to 1977 and 1978.
e) Elections lacking an ideological basis will lead to high rates of split-ticket
voting, since ideology is strongly connected with partisanship. Elections
which are ideology-based will discourage voters from splitting their tickets.
In general, elections to the national legislature in an etat partitaire such as
I rael can never be considered totally non-ideological, while local elections
may or may not be. Of the three elections analysed here, only those of 1978
can be considered non-ideological when we define ideological elections as
those in which fundamental ideology is salient.
Following this line of thought, it is easy to view the 1973 elections,
when national elections were held, as ideology -based, and by the same
token to label the 1978 municipal elections as non-ideological. But viewing
the Histadrut elections of 1977 as ideology-based requires further explanation .
The upheaval of May I 977, expressed in the Alignment's defeat in the
national election and in the formation of a Likud-based government,
sharpened the ideological debate in the Histadrut elections one month later.
Using Campbell's terminology, the upheaval of May 1977 created a highstimulus election in June 1977. But his argument that "a low-stimulus election tends to follow party lines" 14 is inconsistent with the l 977 election in
which party lines were strictly maintained although it was a high-stimulus
11
'
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t

election, and perhaps even because of this. Campbell's differe ntiation b
tween a low-stimulus and a high-stimulus election is insuffic ient. 1
decisive factor is the specific nature of the stimulus. The three cases anaJy~
here aJI represent high-stimulus elections but the stimulus in 1977 was dif.
ferent from that of 1973 and 1978, and therefore had a differe nt effect 0
voting behavior. While the stimulus in 1977 was domestic, the stimuli
I 973 and 1978 were on the international plane: the 1973 electio ns were he(:
two months after the conclusion of the Yorn Kippur War, and the 1978 elec.
tions were held two months after the signing of the Camp David
Agreements. Municipal elections are almost unaffected by such interna.
tional stimuli, but trade union elections are a classic arena for domestic in.
fluences. International stimuli tend in general to create a natio nal consensus
in Israel, as happened to some extent in I 973 and 1978, whi le domestic
stimuli tend in general to create a dissensus which means deep ideological
discussion.
An analysis of the three cases presented above reveals basic differences
which are describe d in Table 4.

t

T able 4: Factors Strengthening Split-Ticket Voting

Personal
candidacy
Histadrut

Procedural
institutionalization

Local authorities
and Knesset 1973

Different
Lack of
institutions ideology

+

1977

Local authorities
1978

Different
levels

+

+
+

+

+

In the 1977 Histadrut elections, a very low rate of split-tic ket voting
reflected the existence of only one strengthening factor (differe nt levels). In
the 1978 elections, two strengthening factors were present-lack of ideology
and personal. candidacy-and
therefore the rate of split-ticket voting was
higher than in the 1977 Histadrut elections. In the 1973 electio ns, the high
rate of split-ticket voting reflected the presence of three strengt hening factors: different levels, different institutions, and high procedu ral institutionalization which was accompanied by a long tradition of ticket-s plitting.

Conclusion
Miller's statement that "coattail influence can exist only where straight
ticket voting prevails"'' is limited to two-party systems. In a multi-party
system such as Israel, coattail influence can exist side by side with splitticket voting. While coattail influence was characteristic of Alig nment sup-
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rters (especially in 1973), among Likud supporters and religious voters,
poch influence was much weaker, resulting in split-ticket voting. Coattail in;uence in the case. of Alignme~t voters is not necessa:il~ a re u~t ?f
harismatic leadership at the national level, but charactenslic of soc1ahst
c arties in which party discipline is salient and the organizational structure
pirong enough to maintain straight-ticket voting. Likud, a bloc of rightwing parties, lacks party discipline and has a loose organizational structure.
Miller's conclusion on the presidential coattail of 1952 is that
"Ei enhower led the Republican congressional ticket primarily because he
failed to carry with him voters who supported him but who would not vote
for his party's congressional candidates." 16 This can be applied to the
1 raeli context. The more votes Likud had achieved in I 973 at the national
level, the more widespread split-ticket voting should have been, namely, the
religious and local lists should have been strengthened. The different trends
of coattail influence between Alignment and Likud voters are interesting
when we take into account the fact that the Likud had a distinguished
chari matic leader, M. Begin, while the Alignment did not. Hence we can
conclude that, in Israel, coattail influence is primarily an organizational,
and to some extent even ideological factor, and not a personal.
Defining the socio-economic composition of the ticket-splitter
is difficult without survey data. De Vries and Tarrance found that members of
trade unions tend to split their tickets less than non-members. 11 While in the
1977 Histadrut elections all voters were trade union members, they contituted only a part of the 1973 and 1978 electorates. This tendency is consistent with the lower split-ticket voting in the 1977 electorates. This tendency
i consistent with the lower split-ticket voting in the 1977 elections. But except for this pattern, our findings indicate a trend opposite to that presented
by De Vries and Tarrance. The typical American ticket-splitter has a high
income, is more educated than the average citizen, is younger, Protestant,
professional and white. 18 While the typical Israeli ticket-spliter has not yet
been studied in a comprehensive survey, we can hypothesize just the oppo ite trends: less integrated into the social-political system, namely lower
ES, lower income, less education, and affiliated with deprived ethnic
groups. The e conclusions are derived from two major findings: most
ticket-splitters are Likud supporters who are mostly lower-class outsiders; 19
plit-ticket voting is high in communities whose residents are mostly lowercla s outsiders.
lt can be argued that the basic paradox of right-wing partie being supported mainly by the lower classes should be accompanied by a moderating
or compensating factor. Here, split-ticket voting emerges as an answer to
this paradox. This hypothesis can be tested in future elections as well as in
other political systems where right-wing parties gain much of their support
from members of the lower class.
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